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Prior the Republic of South Africa’s Constitution Act 108 of 1996, standards regarding fairness 
and equality of women in the labour market left much to be desired. Additionally, section 187(1)(e) 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995(‘LRA’), has become one of the fundamental provisions 
addressing the lack of equality between men and women in the labour force, by classifying a 
dismissal based on pregnancy as an automatic unfair dismissal. The importance of this section is 
to signify to employers that pregnancy is a natural biological process that should be embraced 
within society and not a justifiable reason for dismissal. The overall discussion of the paper 
illustrates the effectiveness and the limitations of S187(1)(e) in providing protection to pregnant 
employees. It will begin by interpreting the wording of the section to explain the extent of 
protection provided to pregnant employees. Thereafter, a detailed study of case law will 
demonstrate the courts’ approach dismissal based on pregnancy. The paper will then explain the 
limitations of S187(1)(e) in that it does not provide absolute protection from dismissal, and then 
briefly discuss the remedies available for unfairly dismissed pregnant employees. The conclusion 
of the paper will summarize the overall impact of S187(1)(e) in addressing discrimination against 
pregnant employees. 
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All societies throughout history, to a greater or lesser degree, have faced inequality and prejudice on the 
basis of gender. Thus every society, in the interests of gender equity, has a moral imperative and a 
practical need for legislation to combat this injustice, and move towards equality and freedom of choice. 
Over the last two centuries, the roles of women in society have drastically shifted to become more 
varied and assertive, from a primarily domestic life of full time child care and chores, to one in 
which women make up a significant part of the labour market. This shift in the workforce has led 
to a multitude of new issues which demand urgent attention from policy makers.By no means the 
only important example, but a central one, and the one the topic of this thesis is pregnancy in the 
workplace1.  
 
As women are the natural carriers of unborn children, and as more women enter the workforce, the need 
to accommodate the specific and unique medical reality of pregnancy in a fair-minded way becomes more and 
more pressing. As part of the larger project of pursuing gender equality, the need to protect women from 
pregnancy related discrimination is a growing concern and has been recognized by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 19962. 
 
Prior the Republic of South Africa’s Constitution Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter the‘1996 
Constitution’) there was little or no protection given to the pregnant employee. A woman that had 
fallen pregnant was only allowed to work for four weeks prior her delivery date, and was  not 
allowed to work for any other employer eight weeks after the birth of the child.3 
 
The most flagrant example of this type of discrimination is when a pregnant woman is simply 
dismissed for absenteeism when they take the medically necessary time to give birth and care for 
their newborn child. T h e  previous Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 did require that the  
 
                                                          
1 JBanks, H Russell‘Pregnancy and Employment: A Literature Review’(2011) ESRI 3. 
2 Section 9 (3) and 23 (1) of the 1996 Constitution provide for protection against discrimination of pregnant 
employees. 




employer justify the reasons for their dismissal of the employee,4 but without concrete guidelines 
on which reasons were justifiable, this was not fully effective in protecting against abuse of this 
kind. Despite its shortcomings, this Act was a step forward in protecting pregnant working 
employees, as it obliged employers to justify their dismissals. 
 
Prior the 1996 Constitution, legislation was influenced by the notion of apartheid within society, 
and thus it is little surprise that the laws regarding female discrimination had been lacking 
fundamental values of equality and fairness. When the 1996 Constitution came into effect, it 
became apparent that existing labour laws did not value the rights to dignity, equality and fairness, 
and that South African laws regarding fairness and equality had not been on par with international 
jurisprudence5. 
 
The 1996 Constitution validates the democratic value of “equality” and stipulates insection 9(3) 
and 9(4) of the Bill of Rights that neither the state nor an individual may “unfairly discriminate, 
whether directly or indirectly against any one on one or more grounds” such as “race, disability, 
religion, age, culture, language and birth,” but more specifically and relevant to the applicable  
study, on the basis of pregnancy it states “no person may unfairly discriminate, directly or 
indirectly, against an employee on the grounds of pregnancy”. (It should be noted that 
discrimination on grounds listed within section 9 of the 1996 Constitution is deemed unfair unless 
it is proven to be justified.)6 
 
Other legislation such as section 6 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (hereafter the 
‘EEA’), upholds this notion. Another provision of interest is s12 of the 1996 Constitution, which 
states that all persons have the right to “bodily and psychological integrity”, which includes the 
right “to make decisions concerning reproduction” and the right “to security in, and control over, 
their body”7. In addition, s 22 and 23 further states that women have the right not to be 
                                                          
4Randall v Progress Knitting Textiles Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 200 (IC) (the employer allowed for the pregnant employee 
to take maternity leave and did not replace the employee. Thus acknowledging the woman’s right to fair labour 
practices). 
5 Such as those countries that had signed with the International Labor Organization Convention 158 at the time 
(USA, UK, France and Belgium). 
6Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution provides for the limitation of rights. 
7Section 12 (2)(a)-(b)of the1996Constitution. 
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discriminated against because of their pregnancy within the labour market.8 It is submitted that if 
the 1996 Constitution had failed to promote such fundamental rights for women, that the Bill of 
Rights would have utterly failed in its underlying purpose. 
 
The LRA in s187(1)(e) aims to promote the Bill of Rights in the workplace.9 The courts have used 
this section to specify that the basic human rights located in the 1996 Constitution are to be highly 
protected and that the categories against which one may not discriminate, shall not be used as 
valid reasons for an employer to dismiss an employee.10 Section 187(1)(e) provides that a 
dismissal is automatically unfair if there as on for the dismissal is the “employee’s pregnancy”, 
“intended pregnancy” , “or any reason related to her pregnancy”. This principle can be 
demonstrated in the case of De Beer v SA Export Connection CCt/a Global Paws11 This case is 
significant because even though the dismissal was related to her maternity leave, the court 
acknowledged that maternity leave fell under the umbrella concept of pregnancy in regards to 
S187(1)(e). It is also important to note that breastfeeding falls within the stipulations of 
S187(1)(e).  A further discussion of this matter is provided later in the study. 
 
 
With the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, South Africa came line with international laws that 
promote equity and fairness with woman at the work place.12 The South African laws regarding 
the dismissal due to pregnancy are on par with the International Labour Organization Convention 
158 of 1982 (hereafterthe“ILO”) and the International Bill of Rights 1948. Both treaties aim to 
promote equality and fairness in the work place and provide guidelines for doing so. 
 
This study is centered on one form of discrimination in which a female employee is dismissed due 
to her pregnancy. Given that pregnancy is a natural part of womanhood, discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy is also discrimination on the basis of sex. This study will critically examine 
S187(1)(e) of the LRA, which asserts that a pregnancy based dismissal is unfair. 
                                                          
8 Section 22 of the 1996 Constitution stipulates that “every citizen has the right to choose a trade, occupation or 
profession freely”, section 23 of the 1996 Constitution states “that everyone has the right to fair labour practices”. 
9 JGrogan WorkplaceLaw 10thed (2011) 
10Mnguni v Gumbi (2004) 25 ILJ 715 (LC); Sheridan v The Original Mary Anne’sat the Colony (Pty) Ltd 
(1999)20ILJ 2952(LC); Lukie v Rural Alliance cct/a Rural Development Specialists (2004) 25 ILJ 1445 (LC). 
11 (2008) 29 ILJ 347 (LC) 
12International Labour Organization Convention 158 of 1982. 
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The main method of the study is the compilation and analytical review of literature and case law 
relating to pregnancy in the workplace to illustrate how the rights of pregnant women are 
protected. In addition to the 1996 Constitution, other relevant legislation will be examined. The 
study also uses a descriptive method in examining how S187(1)(e) has been interpreted and 
applied to in cases of pregnancy dismissals. A number of websites were used to obtain examples 
and applicable information on such dismissals. 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore the key issues regarding dismissal due to pregnancy in light 
of S187(1)(e) and how the section has been interpreted and applied in relevant case law. It will 
examine the various reasons given for dismissing pregnant employees, and how the courts have 
ruled on the fairness of such dismissals. 
 
Chapter 2 will explain the purpose of S187(1)(e), and examine its wording and interpretation of 
S187(1)(e) so as to give the reader a clear background and understanding its significance of the 
section in matters of pregnant employees. The phrases “intended pregnancy” and “any reason 
related to her pregnancy” will be interpreted and discussed along with relevant case law. 
 
Chapter 3, will show how the courts have applied and interpreted S187(1)(e), using the 
following case law: Mnguni v Gumbi (2004)25ILJ715(LC); Wallace v Du Toit (2006)  8 BBLR 
757 (LC) Lukie v Rural Alliance cct/a Rural Development Specialists (2004) 25 ILJ 1445 (LC) 
and Sheridan v The Original Mary Anne’s at the Colony (Pty )Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2952 (LC). 
 
 
In Chapter 4, the liability of the employer with regard to S187 (1)(e) shall be discussed, and further 
explain the onus placed on both the employer and employee when a pregnant employee has been 
dismissed. The chapter will also discuss case law to show how the courts have used their 
discretion in matters of misconduct of the employee, pregnancy as the ancillary reason for 
dismissal and operational requirements of the employer. 
 
Chapter 5, will focus on the remedies available under S187(1)(e). It will examine case law to show 
how the courts have approached the issue of damages and compensation and when granted, 




And finally, Chapter 6 will conclude and summarize the discussion on the topic, to illustrate 











This chapter aims to give the reader a full understanding of the objectives and purpose of section 
 
187(1)(e) of the LRA. Moreover, it will explain what an automatically unfair dismissal is in light 
of S187. It will then provide an in-depth discussion of the wording and interpretation of the 
section, and the phrases “intended pregnancy” and “any reason related to her pregnancy” inlight 
of the 1996 Constitution, the LRA, international law and case law. 
 





The LRA aims at preventing and protecting employees from unfair dismissal. Section 186(1)(c) 
defines that a dismissal takes place when “an employer terminated a contractof employment with or 
with out notice.” A dismissal can occur both fairly and unfairly.13 When there is a clear indication 
that the employee had been dismissed fairly the employer is protected by the LRA, in that there are 
no costs that the employer has to endure. However, if the employer is unsuccessful in proving that 
the substantive and procedural requirements of dismissing an employee had been followed then 
that dismissal will be deemed unfair.14 
 
Section 187 provides for automatically unfair dismissals. These are dismissals which will be regarded as 
substantively unfair if they are for one of the protected reasons. Section 187 lists these protected reasons 
as unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender, sex, culture, religion, disability and any forms 
of discrimination that would impair the employee’s dignity, social standing and rights protected in 
the 1996 Constitution.15 The courts have shown that they will not tolerate dismissals on these bases 
in a multitude of cases: 
 
 
                                                          
13 See schedule 8 of the LRA. 
14Chapter 4 will explain in full detail the onus regarding the employee and employer in unfair dismissal. 
15 BD Workman‘Automatically Unfair Dismissals – Does What You Believe Matter?’2009 Without Prejudice 54. 
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 In Department of Correctional Services and another v Police and Civil Rights Union 
(POPCRU) and others,16 the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) addressed dismissal on the 
basis of religious and cultural grounds.17The employer prohibited dreadlocks in the work 
place within its dress code, and the respondents did not comply with that code.18The 
employer requested the respondents cut their hair to comply with the department’s 
dresscode, and stated that failing to do so would lead to disciplinary action.19 The 
employees refused to cut their hair, and argued that dreadlocks were part of either their 
Rastafarian religion, or Xhosa culture.20 The employees were charged with breaching the 
department’s dress code and insubordination due to failure to carry out direct orders 
without a valid reason.21 The SCA determined that the employees had been automatically 
unfairly dismissed under S187(1)(f) on the grounds of religious and cultural 
discrimination.22  
 
 In Hibbert v ARB Electrical Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd case23 the court held that the employee, 
aged 64, was automatically unfairly dismissed under.24 This was due to the employer’s 
lack of evidence in proving that the employee “reached the normal or agreed retirement 
age for persons employed in that capacity”.25  
 
 In Atkins v Datacentrix (Pty) Ltd,26 the applicant was employed as an IT technician.27 The 
employee announced, shortly after being hired, that he would be undergoing gender re-
assignment.28 The employer proceeded to cancel the employment as he contended the 
failure to announce the gender re-assignment prior to hiring “was a serious case of 
misrepresentation which is dishonesty. It considered his actions to be a repudiation of the 
                                                          
16(107/12) [2013] ZASCA 40. 
17Ibid, 2. 
18 Note 17 above, 2. 
19 Note 17 above, 4. 
20 Note 17 above, 5. 
21 Note 17 above, 6. 
22 Note 17 above, 53. 
23 D775/10 (LC). 
24Ibid, 25. 
25 Note 24 above, 30. 
26(2009) 18 LC 8.29.3 and [2010] 4 BLLR 351 (LC). 
27Ibid, 3. 
28 Note 27 above, 3. 
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employment contract, which repudiation it accepted and no longer required his services.”29 
The applicant claimed he had been discriminated against on the ground of his sexual 
orientation and consequently the dismissal constituted as an automatic unfair dismissal.30 
The court held in favor of the applicant in that the dismissal had fallen in the provisions of 
S187(1)(f) of the LRA hence the dismissal was automatically unfair.31 
 
Section 187 of the LRA requires the applicant to produce evidence which is sufficient to raise a 
credible possibility that they have been automatically unfairly dismissed by their employer. When 
sufficient evidence has been provided by the employee, the employer then bear the onus to show 
that the dismissal did not fall within the ambit of S187 and did not constitute an automatically unfair 
dismissal. In the cases below, the employees had failed to show credible evidence to find the 
employer liable under S187: 
 
 In Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU & Others,32 the Court had to determine 
whether the dismissal of non-union members were automatically unfair. A number of 
employees had taken an unauthorized leave of absence to join a protected strike; however, 
the employees in question did not belong to the majority trade union that would have 
authorized them to have a protected strike. It was evident that separate trade unions were 
required to bring their own action and follow the formal procedures. The employees did not 
follow any of the requirements to qualify for a protected strike, hence their involvement in 
the protected strike of another trade union was deemed to be unlawful, and dismissal was 
held not to be automatically unfair. 
 
 In the case of Beaurain and Leslie Martin N.O v Public Health and Social Development 
Sectoral Bargaining Council and others,33 the applicant was an employee at Groote Schur 
Hospital, where poor maintenance had resulted in foul smells emanating from the toilets. 
The applicant then proceeded to post pictures on Facebook34 of the toilets and made 
                                                          
29 Note 27 above, 1. 
30 Note 27 above, 4. 
31 Note 27 above, 24. 
32 (2012) 3 BLLR 245 (SCA) 
33 (C16/2012). 
34 “Facebook” – a social network website. 
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comments claiming that the poor maintenance of these toilets would result in ‘dirty air’in the 
Hospital, placing both the patients and employees’ at risk. The employee had been given two 
written warnings not to place such photographs and comments on Facebook, but the 
employee neglected the warnings and continued to do so. The employee was dismissed on 
the grounds of gross insubordination. The employee argued that the dismissal was 
automatically unfair based on S187(1)(h). However, the court held that the employee had 
been dismissed fairly due to the employee failing to follow the correct procedures of the 
protected disclosures Act, hence it was not an automatically unfair dismissal. 
 
The above cases illustrate that a claim for automitcally unfair dismissal will not always succeed if 
the employee does not provide sufficient evidence that the dismissal falls within the unfair 
discrimination category.The employer has the burden to prove that the dismissal does not fall 
within S187.35 For the purposes of this discussion, the main focus will be how automatically unfair 
dismissals regarding pregnancy in S187(1)(e) have been dealt with and what conductor action 
justified the dismissals under the section. 
 
2.3 Protection given in section187 (1)(e) 
 
 
Section 187 was addedin to the LRA to further implement the aims of the 1996 Constitution in 
fighting against discrimination in the workplace. Its main objective is to protect employees from 
u n f a i r  discrimination. This section, read along side the 1996 Constitution36 and the EEA37 
identifies a large number of matters in which employers may not discriminate against employees. 
This enforces the policy in which any form of discrimination or infringement on an employee’s 
protected Constitutional and Labour rights by an employer is not tolerated and thus the employer 
will be held liable by law to carry out a specific remedy.38 The remedies given by the courts are 
dependant on specific facts and circumstances of each particular case and as such the remedy in 
each case may vary. 
 
                                                          
35 See section192(2) of the LRA, and Lukie v Rural Alliance cct/a Rural Development Specialists (2004) 25 ILJ 
1445 (LC) 
36 Section 9 and 23 of the 1996 Constitution (grounds of discrimination and right to fair labour practices). 
37 Section6 of the EEA (grounds of discrimination). 
38 Remedies are provided for in section 193 of the LRA, they include either paying out damages, compensation or to 
reinstate the employee. 
10 
 
Section 187(1)(e) specifically applies to the protection against unfair discrimination based on 
pregnancy.39 The purpose of the protection provided is to allow for women to keep their 
employment while pregnant or on maternity leave. To allow that women should be discriminated 
against based on their biological purpose and function of child birth would diminish the goal of 
providing an equal footing for men and women within the labour market. Equality in the 
workplace should be measured by comparing the social standing and biological function of 
women to that of men.40 In addition the protection provided in S187(1)(e) is a tool for pregnant 
women and those on maternity leave to retain their employment.41 It employs a social recognition 
of pregnant women within the workforce, and assures them job security, and holding employers 
responsible for unfair labour practices that would force women to unfairly choose between 
family and career. 
 
 
The protection provided in S187(1)(e) is not an absolute defense against legitimate dismissals. 
The protection only protects against discriminatory, pregnancy related dismissals, but is not an 
absolute shield against dismissals for legitimate reasons. A pregnant employee or applicant can 
be dismissed or refused a job position for any of the legitimate reasons of misconduct or 
operational requirements that apply to non-pregnant persons. 
 
In Woolworths v Whitehead (Pty) Ltd,42 the Court held that the reason for Ms.Whitehead not 
being hired was due to the availability of another individual that was better suited to carry out the 
operational requirements of the employer. Therefore there was no causal link between her 
pregnancy and not being chosen for the job.43 The majority of the judges further held that though 
her pregnancy was taken into account when determining if she would fit the job description, her 
pregnancy status worked against her. The employee presented no evidence to illustrate that if her 
pregnancy status had not been taken into account, she would necessarily have been appointed; 
therefore it was not the primary reason for the hiring decision.44 
 
                                                          
39 It should be noted that the wording of this section allows for a wider interpretation to be given to the word 
“pregnancy” (a further discussion on the wording and interpretation will be discussed below in 2.3 and2.4). 
40 LJ Ledwaba ‘Dismissal due to pregnancy’ for the degree of Magister Legum in the Faculty of Law at the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University 2006 at 26. 
41 DeBeer sv SA Golden Paws (2008) 29 ILJ 347 (LC). 
42 Ibid, 43. 
43 Note 43 above, 48. 




2.4 Wording of section 187(1)(e) 
 
 
Section 187(1)(e) states that: 
 
 
Automatically unfair dismissals 
 
(1) A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, acts 
contrary to section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is-…” 
 
      (e) the employee's pregnancy, intended pregnancy, or any reason related to her pregnancy; 
 
 
The section expressly categorizes discrimination based on pregnancy as automatically unfair 
dismissal. The importance of the wording of this section is that it allows for a wider interpretation, 
by using the phrases “intended pregnancy” and “any reason related to her pregnancy.” This 




It is common knowledge that pregnant women suffer from a variety of common natural symptoms 
of pregnancy such as morning sickness, tiredness, bloating and fatigue; even though the symptoms 
do not affect all women in the same manner, these natural symptoms will have a negative effect on 
average on the way in which an employee performs their daily tasks. Consequently the closer the 
pregnancy is to the due date of the delivery the less energetic the woman will become.45 It is 
submitted that the natural biological response to pregnancy was taken into consideration when 
S187 was drafted as it is clear by the phrase “any reason related” warrants that these natural 
negative impacts or any other illness caused by pregnancy should be taken into account when 
examining whether the dismissal of a pregnant employee is fair.46 
 
 
The wording of this section in addition, intentionally expands the protection to women after they 
have delivered their child.47 This extends the protection provided within S187(1)(e) to a period 
                                                          
45Mnguni v Gumbi (2004) 25 ILJ 715 (LC). 
46 De Beersv SA Golden Paws (2008) 29 ILJ 347 (LC), Mashava v Cuzen &Woods (2000) 6 BLLR 691 (LC). 
47 Masondo v Crossway 1998 19 ILJ (CCMA). 
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after delivery of the child, called maternity leave.48 It is further submitted that the legislature was 
well aware of the crucial need for a newly born child and the employee, a new mother, to create an 
intimate maternal bond, for active full time neo-natal care, and for the employee to recover from 
the tremendous physical stress of delivering the child. The wording of this section is vital to safe 
guarding the interests and wellbeing and of the mother and child, and applies to a reasonable time 




2.5 Interpretation of section 187(1)(e) 
 
In interpreting S187(1)(e) we must refer to the purpose and objective of the statute as fundamental 
guidelines, as set out in s 3 of the Act. In  this way we ensure that  the outcome in the law 
will remain true to the spirit of its drafting. The guidelines provided on interpreting this provision 
are found in s 1 and 3 of the LRA. Section 1 of the LRA sets out the purpose of the Act as follows: 
 
“1. Purpose of this Act 
 
The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratization of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act, which are- 









Section 1 clearly states the main objectives of the statute is to provide a fair and just labour market 
within the Republic, by upholding the rights provided in section 27 of the 1996 Constitution and 
the binding international obligations specified in section 3 of the ILO. Section 27 of the 1996 
Constitution sets out the social-economic and cultural rights that are provided for, such as access: 
to adequate housing, health care, sufficient food and water, social security and labour relations. It 
has been argued that social economical rights are not justiciable or enforceable due to the 
budgetary implications involved and that the realities of enforcement are heavily dependent on the 
                                                          
48 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (hereafter the ‘BCEA’), allows for the employee to take four 
consecutive months of maternity leave either one month before the due date or a date agreed on with the employer. In 
addition, the employee is entitled to have 6 weeks without returning to work. 
49 JC. Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 1 ed (2004) 119. 
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availability of resources; hence these rights are to be dealt with by the legislative and executive 
body of government and not the judiciary.50 However it is submitted that the judiciary is the 
platform where the public can determine or monitor whether the government has maintained or 
reached its goals to provide adequate assistant or protection of the social- economical rights.51 In 
essence allowing the judiciary to preside over these matters does not violate the separation of 
powers doctrine.52 Therefore it is submitted that the judiciary should tread carefully within its final 
judgment by not dwelling on the budget allocation of any social-economical dispute between the 
state and individual; and focus merely on the principle of the rights that are owed to the public.53 It 
is further submitted that before the 1996 Constitution, there was a lack of even distribution of 
social-economical rights; therefore it is highly imperative that the implementation of these rights be 
subject to the judiciary body, to address and enforce the “progressive realization” of these rights.54 
 
The ILO works as an agency of the United Nations (UN) to promote opportunities for men and 
women in obtaining decent and productive work that is characterized by conditions of freedom, 
equity, security and dignity.55 The Rrepublic signed with the ILO in 1995 in order to amend and 
address the lack of fair labour practices of the pre-1994 era. This agreement bound SA to the 
labour law standards of the ILO, and made enforceable the ILO obligations, rules and regulations, 
which became the frame-work on which the republic founded its labour law.56 These binding 
obligations include upholding the rights to freedom of association, for employees and employers 
to engage in collective bargaining and equality within the work environment. It is imperative that 
all labour laws fall within the binding guidelines of the ILO.57 
 
Section 3 of the LRA states: 
 
3. Interpretation of this Act 
 
                                                          
50 JC. Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 1 ed (2004) 119. 
51 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwa Zulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 756 (CC). 
52 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996.  
53  Note 53, above. 
54 Minister of Health & others v Treatment Action Campaign and others 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC). 
55 The Origins and History of the International Labour Orginaization available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm,accessedon16June2014. 
56 AJ. Mbilinyi Protection Against Unfair Dismissal of Employees Living with HIV/AIDS In The Workplace: A 
Comparative Study, Dissertation submitted in the part fulfillment of the requirements for MasterLegum at the 
University of South Africa 2008, 44. 
57 Due to the binding effect with the Convention. 
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Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions- 
(a) To give effect to its primary objectives; 
Amended Labour Relations Act Page 9 of 155 
(b) In compliance with the Constitution; and 
(c) In compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic. 
 
Section 3 of the LRA as stated above clearly refers to the primary objectives of the Act, and 
instructs that these objectives guide interpretation of the act. The primary objectives of the Act 
are as follows: 
 
 To give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of the 
constitution, including the right to fair labour practices, to form and join trade unions and 
employer organizations to organize and bargain collectively, and to strike and lockout. 
 To provide a framework for regulating the relationships between employees and their trade 
unions on the one hand and employers and their organizations on the other hand. At the 
same time also encourages employers and employers to regulate relations between 
themselves. 
 To promote orderly collective bargaining, collective bargaining at sectorial level, employee 
participation indecision-making in the work place and the effective resolution of labour 
disputes.58 
 
As seen in these objectives, the focus of the action regulating the employer and employee 
relationship, to encourage and allow for employees to form and join trade unions and employers to 
join employer organizations, participation in workplace decision-making, and for there to be 
regulations on strikes and collective bargaining. 
 
The next aspect of s 3 of the LRA, is that the interpretation of the Act should be in line with the 
1996 Constitution. Section 23 of the 1996 Constitution clearly states that “everyone has the right 
to fair labour practices.” The word “everyone”in this provision may be slightly unclear as to who 
the provision refers to, but it is submitted that the word “everyone” encompasses the employer and 
                                                          
58 ‘Summary: LabourRelationsAct available  at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west 
1.amazonsws.com/docs/2000/appendieces/000229LRASummary.htmFebuary 25, 2000, accessed on 13 March 2015. 
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employee, as well as any employer and employee organizations or trade unions.59 The word 
‘everyone’ within the provision additionally implies that section 9 and 7 of the 1996 
Constitution should be read along with the provisions, thereby broadening the provisions.  
 
The final aspect of section 3 is that the Act must be interpreted in compliance with the public 
international law obligations of the Republic. As stated above South Africa is bound to the ILO to 
provide fair labour practices, which entails that the laws and regulations of the Republic must be 
interpreted to adhere to international standards. 
 
Any interpretation of the LRA must be done in a manner that is consistent with the 1996 
Constitution,60 international labour obligations,61 and the objectives of s 1 and 3 of the LRA.62 Any 
such proper interpretation must therefore preserve the rights of, and treat fairly, pregnant employees. 
Any interpretation that fails to do so is in violation of s 3 and is an unjustifiable interpretation. 
 
2.6 “Intended Pregnancy” 
 
The phrase “intended pregnancy” in S187(1)(e) is most likely meant to guard against the situation 
where an employee has expressed the desire to become pregnant, and is then treated prejudicially 
on this basis by the employer. Interpretation of this phrase has at times caused difficulties in 
determining the true cause of the dismissal.63 For instance in the case of Uys v Imperial Car Rental 
(PTY) Ltd64 the employee, three days after being appointed to a managerial position, informed her 
immediate superior that she was pregnant.65 The superior became very angry and instructed the 
applicant to sign her letter of employment.66 Approximately two weeks later, the applicant was 
summoned to a disciplinary inquiry and accused of gross negligence for “losing a couple of 
debtor’s files, inflating the salary figure she claimed to have earned from her previous employer, 
and unsatisfactory work performance.”67 The applicant was found guilty of the formal charges 
                                                          
59 JC. Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 1 ed (2004) 123. 
60 Section 1, 9 and 23 of the 1996 Constitution. 
61 ILO Convention 158 and 1982. 
62 Section 1 and 3 of the LRA. 
63Grogan JWorkplace Law 7th ed (2000) 137. 
64 (2007) 3 BLLR 270 (LC) 
65 Ibid, 2. 
66 Note 66 above, 9. 
67 Note 66 above, 10. 
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against her and was dismissed.68 The applicant claimed she was dismissed on account of her 
pregnancy.69 The court however rejected the applicant’s argument that she had been dismissed 
because of her pregnancy and also dismissed the employer’s allegations that the applicant had 
misplaced debtors files.70 The court held the reason for dismissal was due to her inflating her 
salary, hence the applicant was not granted a ruling of automatic unfair dismissal.71 However the 
court did acknowledge that the dismissal was harsh and awarded the applicant 6 months 
compensation.72 
 
It is imperative that women that are, or intend to become pregnant and inform their employers are 
still able to retain their employment and not to be discriminated against by their employers based 
on the employee’s decision concerning reproduction; and the implications of that choice on work 
attendance or performance.73 
 
2.7 “Any reason related to her pregnancy” 
 
The words “any reason related to her pregnancy” have been given a wide definition to protect 
pregnant and post-pregnant employees. In the case of De Beers v Golden Paws,74 the applicant 
took one month maternity leave by agreement with the employer to nurse her newly born twins. 
The applicant’s twins became ill soon after the one-month maternity leave was over and the 
employee applied for another month of leave. The employer only allowed the employee two more 
weeks and when she failed to appear for work after that time, was dismissed. The employee took 
the matter to court and argued that she had been automatically unfairly dismissed by her employer 
under S187(1)(e) as this was a matter related to her pregnancy. The employer argued however that 
maternity leave did not qualify as a reason related to her pregnancy. The court rejected the 
argument of the employer and pointed out that “reasons related to pregnancy” refers not only to 
the mother herself but also the new born babies. The BCEA provides that pregnant employees are 
provided with up-to four months maternity leave after birth, therefore the agreement for the 
                                                          
68 Note 66 above, 11. 
69 Note 66 above, 12. 
70 Note 66 above, 57. 
71 Note 66 above, 80. 
72 Note 66 above, 80. 
73 Wallace v DuToit (2006)8 BLLR 757 (LC). 
74 (2008) 29 ILJ 347 (LC). 
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employee to return after a month was null and void.75 The court held that the employee had been 
automatically dismissed unfairly. It is important to note the phrase “reasons related to her 
pregnancy” should be read together with the BCEA to protect women after pregnancy. The court 
further submitted that: 
 
“Difficulties experienced by employees in keeping a woman’s job open while she is on maternity 
leave is the price that must be paid for recognizing the equal status of women in the work place. 
The law protects women, not only while pregnant, but also while they are attending to the 
consequences of pregnancies”. 
 
It is submitted that the intention of the legislature regarding the phrase “any reason related to her 
pregnancy” was to make sure that the biological interests of women and new borns are protected. 
Otherwise women would be legally dismissed on the ground of pregnancy without any 
consequence to the employer. 
                                                          










This chapter will discuss how the courts have interpreted and applied S187(1)(e) of theLRA in the 
following cases: Mnguni v Gumbi (2004) 25 ILJ 715 (LC); Wallace v Du Toit(2006) 8 BBLR 757 
(LC); Lukie v Rural Alliance cct/a Rural Development Specialists (2004) 25 ILJ 1445 (LC) and 
Sheridan v The Original Mary Anne’s at the Colony (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2952 (LC).These 
cases will give an overview of how South African courts have ruled on matters relating to fair 
treatment of pregnant employees. 
 
3.2 Wallace v Du Toit (2006) 8 BLLR 757 (LC) 
 
 
In this case the respondent employed the applicant as an au pair for his children. After two years, 
the applicant became pregnant, and her employment was terminated. The employer offered to keep 
her on for 3 months when he could not find a replacement, and she took the offer in hopes that the 
employer would change his mind. But the employer dismissed her after finding a replacement 
worker.76 The applicant did not immediately file for unfair dismissal as she was unaware of the 
protection granted to her by S187(1)(e).77 When the applicant found out that she had a cause of 
action, she took the matter to the CCMA and sought compensation under the LRA for being 
automatically unfairly dismissed and damages under the EEA. 
 
The respondent claimed that he expressed at the pre-employment stage that he was opposed to the 
au pair having children, believing that “if the employee had her own children it would inevitably 
affect the devotion she would provide to his children.” He explained his attitude saying that such a 
person“would not be able to put his children first and would not be as flexible as a person without 
parenting responsibilities”.78 In addition the respondent argued “that there had been no dismissal 
but rather a consensual termination.” He argued that the “contract provided a mechanism for its 
own termination and that had simply occurred”.79 This, he claimed, meant that by becoming 
                                                          
76 Note 75 above, 4. 
77 Note 75 above, 5. 
78 Note 75 above, 10. 
79 Note 75 above, 4. 
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pregnant, she had agreed to the termination of employment as she was aware of the respondent’s 
position. However, the applicant claimed that while they had discussed marital status before hiring, 
she denied being told that remaining childless was a condition of employment. The applicant 
claimed that she had merely informed the respondent of her lack of intention to have children at the 
time, and that it was not a condition for termination of the contract.80 
 
 
The court noted that the employment agreement was very loose, with no actual written terms that 
stipulated a termination of employment in the event of pregnancy. The respondent alleged that 
childlessness was an operational requirementof the job.81 In addition the court noted that the 
respondent was an attorney and ought to have taken steps to avoid the situation by having a clear 
and valid employment contract.82 The court further held that the employer’s personal values 
prohibiting his au pair from having children were inconsistent with the 1996 Constitution and 
contra bonos mores and thus enforceable. The court determined that while the applicant had 
accepted the consequences of becoming pregnant she had not consented to the termination of 
employment.83 
 
The court found that the employee had been dismissed under 187(1)(e) and emphasized that the 
respondent’s claimed “inherent requirement of the job even if it was sustainable, cannot in law 
provide a legal justification”.84 In other words if the reason for dismissal is related to the 
pregnancy of an employee, it will be considered as automatic unfair and unjustifiable by law, 
irrespective of the employer’s claims of operational requirements .85 The court, seeking to 
accommodate personal values, took into account the respondent’s wish for a childless employee 
when setting the amount of compensation.86 
 
On the matter of the respondent’s claim of operational requirements and personal values, the court 
stated that “it was evidently clear by the facts that there had been unfair discrimination in terms of 
                                                          
80 Note 75 above, 10. 
81 Note 75 above, 14. 
82 Note 75 above, 7. 
83 Note 75 above, 10. 
84 Note 75 above, 17. 
85 Note 75 above, 17. 
86 Note 75 above, 18. 
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section 6(1) of the EEA since it certainly cannot be said that the inherent requirement of the job 
required that the employee must not be pregnant nor aparent”.87 
 
This case illustrates that if the values of an individual are not in accordance with the 1996 
Constitution, they do not provide a justification for dismissal, but maybe a mitigating factor in 
determining damages. 
 
3.3 Mnguni v Gumbi (2004) 25 ILJ 715 (LC) 
 
   
In this case, the applicant was 8 months pregnant and employed as a receptionist in a private 
medical practice. On the day in question (17th March, 2002) she complained of tiredness and her 
employer became angry, physically ejected her from the office and said not to return to the office 
until he telephoned.88 After a week with no word, the applicant came to her workplace and found 
another woman occupying her position. The employer informed her that he was not content with 
her work performance and had found a replacement receptionist. The applicant attempted to 
discuss severance pay but the respondent brushed her off. The applicant took the matter to court 
seeking an automatically unfair dismissal finding. 
 
The applicant argued that her employer had dismissed her on the basis of her pregnancy and had 
replaced her following the incident. The employer argued that he merely told her to go home and 
that he had sent her a letter (26th March, 2002) instructing her to return to work and posted it to her 
address, however the employee claimed that she had never received the letter in question. 
 
The court held in this matter that the employer had ample opportunity to ask the employee to 
return to work, and rejected his claim regarding the letter. The court further held that replacing the 
employee without giving her any notice of termination indicated an unfair dismissal, and 
unambiguously condemned his behavior: 
 
“When the applicant told the respondent that she was tired and needed a rest, 
the respondent did not consult with her as to what the cause of tiredness was. 
He knew that she was pregnant and was due for maternity leave the following 
week. Despite knowing the cause of her tiredness he bursted into anger, 
                                                          
87 Note 75 above, 20. 
88 Note 47 above, 5. 
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physically pushed her out of the workplace, threw her bag out at her and told 
her to go home and not to come to work. This kind of the treatment of an 
employee is outrageous and nolonger has a place in this country”.89 Also that 
“Employers are prohibited from dismissing employees for any reason related 
to pregnancy (section 187(1)(e)). The phrase ‘any reason related to 
pregnancy’ which the legislature has made use of in Section187 (1)(e) is, in 
my view, wide enough to cover the dismissal of the applicant in this case”.90 
 
 
The Labour Court found that the employee had been automatically unfair dismissed in violation of 
S187(1)(e) for the following reasons: 
 
 The employer replaced the employee with a new receptionist the day following the 
incident, indicating that she had been dismissed on the spot.91 
 The employer failed to contact the employee to return to work, nor was there any evidence 
to support the claim to have sent a letter.92 
 The employer refused to discuss severance pay.93 
 
The employee was awarded 24 months remuneration in compensation.94 This case emphasizes that 
employers must be conscientious of the biological effects of pregnancy such as tiredness, and that a 
dismissal on such a basis, falls under the protection of the phrase “any reason related to 









In the case of Lukie v Rural Alliance cc95 the applicant was employed as an account clerk and 
receptionist. She informed her manager that she would need maternity leave and he initially 
agreed, but rescinded his agreement and instructed the applicant not to return to work after the 
                                                          
89 Note 47 above, 17. 
90 Note 47 above, 17. 
91 Note 47above, 18 (thus she could not be reinstated). 
92 Note 47 above, 20. 
93 Note 47 above, 16. 
94 Note 47 above, 23. 
95 (2004) 25 ILJ 1445 (LC), 2. 
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birth of her child.96 The employee took the matter to court and argued that she has been dismissed 
based on her pregnancy.97 The manager argued that the reason for her dismissal was poor 
performance, and that she had been informed of this in a meeting. He testified that he had 




The court held that the manager’s version of the meeting was vague and contradictory. The 
manager could not recall when the claimed meeting had taken place, what the employee’s 
responses were during the meeting, or what exactly was discussed.99 The employer further 
testified that he was under the impression that the employee would not return after her pregnancy. 
The court emphasisedthat this assumption would not cast any doubt on whether there was actually 
other valid reason that she had been dismissed as the respondent claim was an improper defense. 




As with the Mnguni100case, the employer argued that the dismissal was not based on pregnancy 
but on operational requirements. It should be noted that neither the employee nor the manager had 
any supporting evidence attached to their witness statements, thus the court was left to determine 
which version was most probable.101 Francis J held in that regard: 
 
“I do not agree with the respondent’s contentions. In terms of S187(1)(c) of the Act, a dismissal is 
automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is the employee’s pregnancy, intended 
pregnancy, or any other reason related to her pregnancy. For all of these reasons, I am satisfied 
that the applicant has on a balance of probabilities proven that her dismissal was related to her 
pregnancy”.102 
 
                                                          
96 Note 97 above, 3. 
97 Note 97 above, 5. 
98 Note 97 above, 13. 
99 Note 97above, 16 (the manager stated that the meeting was a general discussion and that a further meeting would 
have taken place in the future). 
100 Note 47 above, 17. 
101 Note 97above, 17-18. 
102 Note 97 above, 18. 
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The Court therefore held that the dismissal was automatically unfair under s187. The employee 
was awarded 18 months’ remuneration in compensation.103 Why did the court award this amount? 
What did it take into account? This case illustrates that even where there is some ambiguity as to 
the true reason for dismissal, it is sufficient that there be a causal link between the dismissal and 
the pregnancy. The court demonstrated that it would not be fooled by an employer’s attempt to 
disguise a pregnancy related dismissal on other grounds. Moreover, the courts will not turn a blind 
eye to matters that concern dismissal of pregnant employees, and that doing so constitutes 
discrimination on theground of sex and pregnancy as prohibited by the constitution.  
 
3.5 Sheridan v The Original Mary Anne’s at the Colony (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2952 (LC) 
 
 
In this case the employee was promoted from waitress to administrative manager, but still retained 
her former duties.104 The applicant was then summoned to a meeting where her shifts were 
decreased from five shifts to only one, effective immediately.105 This meant that she would work 
on Monday evenings. The applicant expressed her dissatisfaction and got no response.106 The 
employer then relieved her of her duties with immediate effect and was told not to return to work 
the following Monday.107 The applicant did come to work and found she had been replaced, which 
she took to be a dismissal. At the time, she was three months pregnant108 and her pregnancy was 
known to the respondent who argued that she could not cope with the work load. The applicant 
then asked for her unemployment card and the respondent refused.109 
 
The applicant took the matter to a dispute resolution council but it remained unresolved. She then 
brought the case to the CCMA where it was still unresolved, before proceeding to Labour 
Court.110 The Applicant argued that she had been unfairly dismissed based on her pregnancy while 
the respondent argued that she had been dismissed based on her inability to cope with her work 
load.111 
 
                                                          
103 Note 97 above, 19. 
104 Sheridan v The Original Mary Anne’s at the Colony (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2952 (LC), 5. 
105 Note 106 above, 13. 
106 Note 106 above, 15. 
107 Note 106 above, 16. 
108 Note 106 above, 17. 
109 Note 106 above, 19. 
110 Note 106 above, 14. 
111 Note 106 above, 17. 
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The Labour Court began by reviewing the inadequate protection that was provided for in past 
legislation regarding dismissal of pregnant women,112 then examined various provisions of 
legislation that had been reformed to provide adequate protection such as the LRA,1996 
Constitution and BCEA. On the basis of S187(1)(e) the court held that:113 
 
“A pregnant employee who finds herself dismissed on the grounds that she is pregnant can now 
approach this court in protection, on any of the two grounds set out in s187(1)(e) and 187(1)(f) of 
the Act, or the residual unfair labour practices below. Alternatively, she can invoke the provisions 
of the Constitution. In the first instance interms of s187(1)(e), the dismissal would be automatically 
unfai, because the Act proscribes unfair dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy. In the second 
instance in terms of s187(1)(f) the dismissal is discriminatory on arbitrary grounds. Further she 
could argue that her discrimination is unfair on the ground of her sex. The latter argument can be 
entertained both under the Act and under the Constitution”. 
 
The court further stated that:114 
 
“significantly s187(1)(f) is apparently a restatement of article 5(d) of Convention 158 of the 
International Labour Organization which provides as follows: ‘the following, interalia, shall not 
constitute valid reasons for termination:(d) race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social lreligion.” 
 
The court found that the employer’s actions had been insensitive and despicable having refused 
the unemployment card, and that she was entitled to unemployment benefits whether she had been 
dismissed or not.115 The court held that the dismissal was automatically unfair and awarded the 
employee compensation of 24 months’ remuneration.116 
 
The case above demonstrates that S187(1)(e) reconciles the irregularities of the previous 
legislation that did not provide compensation for pregnancy related dismissals. The court, in 
                                                          
112 Note 106 above ,21(Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983, Labour Relations Act no 28 of 1956 and 
   Unemployment Insurance Act 30 of 1966). 
113 Note 106 above, 38. 
114 Note 106 above, 39. 
115 Note 106 above, 47. 
116 Note 106 above, 49. 
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examining previous legislation, allowed the application of S187(1)(e) to address inequality and 
sex discrimination within the workplace. The case shows how S187(1)(e) of the LRA should be 
applied and interpreted so that it shall have a positive impact in protecting unfairly dismissed 
pregnant employees.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 




This chapter will discuss what constitutes fairness of dismissal under section 187(1)(e) of the 
LRA, and on the valid reasons that may be given for a dismissal to be fair. Such reasons include 
misconduct, ancillary reasons for dismissal and operational requirements, and these will be 
discussed along side relevant case law showing how S187(1)(e) has been applied to pregnancy 
related dismissals. 
 
4.2 Fairness According to the LRA 
 
 
The LRA requires in order for a dismissal to be upheld, both the procedural and substantive aspect 
of the dismissal must be deemed fair.117 Failure on either procedural or substantive grounds will 
render the dismissal unfair,118 and thus it is in incumbent on an employer to ensure that both 
requirements have been positively fulfilled when dismissing an employee, or risk paying 
compensation to the wronged employee. 
 
The procedural aspect of a fair dismissal demands that the employee be heard before dismissal119 
on the basis of the natural law theory of audi alteram partem120 (the right to a fair hearing). This 
requirement does not mean that the employee must take the matter to court in order to have a fair 
hearing but merely that the employee is given a chance to give their version of events. 
 
Substantive fairness requires that the reasons of the dismissal can be justified and adheres to the 
law. The employer must not have broken a rule or regulation that is consistent with public policy 
their employment contract.121 The following grounds for termination constitute a fair dismissal: 
 
 “Misconduct (the employees conduct has to be grossly negligent).”122 
                                                          
117The procedural and substantive requirementsof a fair dismissal are located in the Code of Good Practices for 
Dismissals (schedule 8,) of the LRA. 
118 Note 47above. 
119 DuToit et al Labour Relations Law 5ed (2005) 403. 
120 “Hear both sides”. 
121  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 399. 
122 Chapter 6 – Labour Law http://www.paralegaladvice.org.za/docs/cha06/15.html, accessed on 8th  August, 2014. 
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 “Incapacity (the employee fails to meet his/her job description, or is unable to fulfill the 
duty within the employment contract due to illness, disability or lack of skill).”123 
 “Retrenchment or redundancy (the employer is reducing the number of employed staff, or 
there ‘is a restructuring of the company).”124 
 
The above reasons are exclusive, and are the only legitimate reasons for dismissal. Thus, even 
were it not stated directly, it would be clear that any dismissal on the basis of discrimination is 
invalid.125 Such a dismissal falls under S187 as an automatically unfair regardless of the 
procedural aspect (as discussed in 2.1). However a dismissal based on discrimination may not be 
automatically unfair the employer can justify it on the grounds of operational requirements.126 In 
other words a claim of S187(1)(e) does not give the right to the full maximum compensation of 24 





When an employee claims that they have been discriminated against,127 it is important that they 
prove that there is a causal link between the discrimination and dismissal.128 In the matter of an 
alleged pregnancy related dismissal, the court must determine if the pregnancy really was the reason for 
the dismissal, or if there was another reason.129 In other words, would the dismissal still have taken 
place if there had been no knowledge of the employee‘s “pregnancy” or “reasons related to her 
pregnancy? If the answer is yes, the dismissal was not automatically unfair. If no, then the 
pregnancy had an influence on the dismissal and depending on the facts, render the employers 
conduct automatically unfair.130 
 
Establishing that the dismissal would not have occurred in the absence of knowledge of the 
pregnancy does not in itself render the dismissal automatically unfair, but depending on the 
specifics of the case, that is often the most probably inference to be drawn.131The question of 
                                                          
123 Chapter 6 –Labour Law http://www.paralegaladvice.org.za/docs/cha06/15.html, accessed on 8th August, 2014. 
124 Chapter 6 –Labour Law, Ibid. 
125 Du Toit et al (Note 124 above, 402). 
126 Note 43 above. 
127 Either on the grounds of EEA (s6) or s187of the LRA. 
128 Note 43 above. 
129LJ Ledwaba Dismissal due to pregnancy for the degree of MagisterLegum in the Faculty of Law at the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University 2006, 20. 
130 LJ Ledwaba (Ibid 20). 
131 LJ Ledwaba (note 131 above 20) 
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whether the employee would have been dismissed irrespective of their pregnancy status is a 
crucial one in evaluation these cases.132 
 
 
4.4 Burden of Proof 
 
Section 192 of the LRA clarifies who bears the burden of proof in matters of 
dismissal, stating that: 
 
“192. Onus in dismissal disputes 
 
(1) In any proceedings concerning any dismissal, the employee must establish the existence of the 
dismissal. 
(2) If the existence of the dismissal is established, the employer must prove that the dismissal is 
fair”. 
 
The burden falls on the employee firstly to establish that a dismissal has in fact occurred. The 
provision does not elaborate specifically how the employee might go about proving that they have 
been dismissed, but in practice, any written document with clear notification of dismissal or 
conduct that clearly indicates dismissal is generally accepted. Once the employee has established 
that they have been dismissed, the burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the 
dismissal was fair. 
 
While the provision does not refer directly to automatically unfair dismissals, the words “any 
dismissal” suggests that the provision is inclusive of such proceedings. However, it is submitted that 
in cases with a strong claim of an automatically unfair dismissal, the word “fair” within the 
provision should not be interpreted to allow the employer to argue substantive and the procedural 
elements. Doing so would weaken the application of S192 on automatic unfair dismissals by 
failing to consider S187 alongside s192.133 This would open the door to allow employers to mask 
their true, discriminatory reason for dismissal as an operational requirement, and to focus the 
attention of the courts on the “fairness” of their “red herring,” rather than on the question of 
discrimination. This would permit employers to escape the liability of discriminatory dismissals, 
                                                          
132Woolworths v Whitehead (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 571 (LAC), Mashava v Cuzen & Woods (2000) 6 BLLR 691 (LC). 
133 R Ismail Analyzing the onus issue in dismissals emanating from the enforcement of unilateral changes to 
conditions of employment http://saflii.org/za/jurnals/PER/2011/42.rtf. 
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wherever there is uncertainty or disputeas to the reason for dismissal. Under this interpretation, 
an employer who wished to be rid of a pregnant employee, would be highly motivated to 
manufacture this uncertainty, allege another reason for her dismissal, and expect to be heard 
on the “fairness” of their red herring. This would nullify the “automatic” aspect of finding a 
dismissal automatically unfair. 
 
In the case of SACWU v AFROX,134 the courts used section 187(1)(c) to show what was required of 
the employee to meet their burden of proof in establishing an automatic unfair dismissal. The 
courts stated:135 
 
(i)    “The employee needs only to establish the existence of a dismissal, in the simplest form, as in 
defined in section 186(1)(a), to discharge the onus in section 192(1)”. 
(ii)     “Thereafter the employer must prove that the dismissal was not effected for the purposes set out 
in section 187(1)(c), to discharge the onus in section 192(2),” 
(iii)     “If the employer overcomes the onus referred to in subparagraph (ii) herein above (which 
would mean that the dismissal is not automatically unfair, then the employer may need to 
further establish that the dismissal was effected for a fair reason based on the employers 
operational requirements in accordance with fair procedure”. 
 
This illustrates that in matters seeking an automatic unfair dismissal, a simple burden of proof is 
placed on the employee to demonstrate that the dismissal was based on grounds listed in S187. The 
employer then must prove that the dismissal was not based on discriminatory grounds in order to 
avoid the finding of automatic unfair dismissal. If the employer is able to prove that discrimination 
was not the cause, then and only then may they attempt to argue that the dismissal was 
substantively and procedurally fair, on the basis of operational requirements or another valid cause 
for dismissal.136 It is submitted that this case sets out the proper reading of the law, in which s187 is 





                                                          
134(1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
135 R. Ismail note 135 above available,http://saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2011/42.rtf 
136Further, that a fair and formal procedure of dismissal has been carried out. 
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Where the main reason for the dismissal is pregnancy, the employer cannot rely on an ancillary 
reason to dismiss, such as failure to disclose pregnancy. This is meant to prevent employers from 
hiding the prejudiced dismissal behind a secondary reason. The following cases illustrates the 
point: 
 
In the case of Mashava v Cuzen & Wood137 the applicant was employed on probation 
anticipating that she would enter in to articles of clerkship with a partner of the firm. 
However, the firm terminated her services claiming that she had be dishonest by failing to 
reveal and concealing her pregnancy. They argued that in doing so, the employee had lured the 
firm in to registering her for articles of clerkship. The employee then made an application to 
the court on the grounds of automatic unfair dismissal. The employer argued before the 
court that the “employer-employee” trust had been broken by failing to disclose her 
pregnancy status when they offered a position as a candidate attorney. The court held that 
there is “no immediate obligation of the employee to disclose her pregnancy to the 
employer”. The court affirmed that the same standard applied to those employed on a 
probationary basis. In addition, the alleged deceit was found to be non-existent because the 
real reason for the dismissal was her pregnancy status, and because there was never any 
obligation to disclose that information to begin with. This case demonstrates that the failure 
to disclose pregnancy to an employer is not an obligation and cannot be a ground for 
dismissal. 
 
In the case of Swart v Greenmachine Horticultural Services (A division of Sterikleen (Pty) Ltd))138 
the employee did not inform her employer that she was pregnant at the time of her appointment. 
When this became known to the employer, she was subjected to harassment by her manager, on 
the supposed basis of a break down in trust and inability of the employee to cope with her job. She 
was there after dismissed by the employer for “insubordination,” “poor performance,” and 
“omission of critical information at time of application for employment regarding pregnancy.” 
The employer argued that there was no connection between the employee’s dismissal and her 
pregnancy, and that only the “dishonesty” and performance were at issue. The court found the 
                                                          
137 (2000) 6 BLLR 691 (LC). 
138 (2010) 3 1ILJ 180 (LC). 
31  
opposite, that there was a strong connection between the termination and the pregnancy, and found 
the dismissal to be automatically unfair. The court reinforced that there exists no legal or moral 
responsibility to disclose a pregnancy to an employer other than as required for purposes of the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act.139 This obligation extends to both unexpected and planned 
pregnancy. It follows logically, that there can be no dishonesty, deceit, or breach of trust in not 
revealing information that you are under no obligation to reveal. 
 
In Memela and another v Ekhamanzi Springs Pty Ltd,140 the employer’s spring water bottling 
business was located on the premises of a mission station. Both applicants were employed by the 
bottling company, and worked on property belonging to the mission station. The Mission's code of 
conduct prohibited that unmarried women staying or working on its premises become pregnant.141 
Given that the employer operated on the mission's premises, the employees became subject to the 
missions code of conduct. However, the two applicants became pregnant in breach of the missions 
regulations, and consequently were denied entry to the premises.142 With no access to their work 
stations, they were unable to carry out their duties, and their employment was terminated.The 
applicants claimed that their dismissal was automatically unfair, as the reason for their dismissal 
was based on their “pregnancy” and “or a reason related to their pregnancy.”143 The employer 
argued that it had not dismissed it employees. 
 
The first applicant was dismissed from the case due to her non-attendance at court, but the second 
case proceeded. The courts placed the evidential burden on her to establish both that she had been 
dismissed and that the dismissal was due to her pregnancy.144 The employee argued that the 
dismissal was for reasons related to her pregnancy, as the employer had failed to intervene with the 
mission to grant them access to the work premises. The court held that the mission’s preventing 
them from working not only amounted to a dismissal but to an automatically unfairdismissal’ under 
section 187(1)(e), entitling them to either reinstatement (with backpay) or compensation equal to 
24 months’ remuneration. The court noted crucially, that an employer may not relinquish its duty 
to protect their employees from discrimination, by resorting to their code of conduct, or in this instance 
                                                          
139 Section 25 of the BCEA. 
140 (2012) 33 ILJ 2911 (LC) 
141 Ibid, 2. 
142 Note 142 above, 1. 
143 Note 142 above, 1. 
144 Note 142 above, 13. 
32  
the mission’s code of conduct.145 The case further established that the employer had an obligation 
to protect their employees irrespective of the marital status by making arrangements with the 
mission to accommodate such scenarios.146 This case is significant in asserting that a company 
must provide job security and freedom from discrimination to its employees, and may not “contract 
out” or otherwise avoid this responsibility, even if the discriminatory policy comes from a 





Incapacity in regards to poor work performance in item 9 of schedule 10 of the LRA states: 
 
 
“Any person determining whether a dismissal for poor work performance eis unfair should consider– 
 
(a) whether or not the employee failed to meet a performance standard; and 
 
(c) if the employee did not meet a required performance standard whether or not- 
 
(i) the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have been aware, 
of the required performance standard; 
(ii)  the employee was given a fair opportunity to meet the required performance 
standard; and 
 




The above provision makes it clear that an employee may be dismissed on the ground of poor work 
performance, and that the employer may use this provision as a defense to a claim of unfair 
dismissal or even automatically unfair dismissal. This defense takes full effect if the employee was 
aware of, and had fair opportunity to meet the employer’s work standards. The defense of poor 
work performance has been supported by the courts regarding pregnant employees thus section1 




In the case of Nadia v B & B t/a Harvey World Travel Northcliff,147 the employee began 
employment subject to a three month probationary period. On the second month, she discovered that 
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she was three months pregnant148 and informed her employer; whereupon the employer 
congratulated her on the pregnancy, and informed her that her work performance was 
unsatisfactory.149 The employers offered her alternate position at a lesser salary out of good will. 
The following day they handed her a two weeks’ notice of dismissal from the probationary 
position, which she signed.150 The employee then informed her employer that she would not be 
accepting the lessor position and left her job. She later took the matter to the CCMA alleging she 
had been automatically unfairly dismissed based on her pregnancy. She argued that she was given 
notice of dismissal the day after informing them of her pregnancy, leading her to assume that the 
real reason for her dismissal was her pregnancy status. The employer argued it had established a 
problem with her poor work performance and lateness before she announced her pregnancy.151The 
court found in favor of the employer; that her dismissal was based solely based on performance, 
and that even when offered a new job still failed to perform her duties.152 
 
 
4.7 Inherent Job Requirements 
 
The phrase “inherent requirements of the job” implies that the job itself have essential requirements 
that are unavoidable in the performance of that job.153 The courts have often taken a strict approach 
interpreting this phrase, as a looser interpretation could be the basis for many unjust findings. In the 
case of Association of Professional Tteachers and Another v Minister of Education and others,154 
the Labour Court held that the inherent job requirement defense be disallowed when it is based on 
the perception that one sex is superior to the other. Elaborate on this. What are the circusmtacnes 
when sex can be argued as an inherent job requirement? Read the case carefully. The case of 
IMATU & Another v City of Cape Town155emphasized that the inherit job requirement defense 
must not violate the Constitutional principles of human dignity, freedom and equality. What was 
the inherent job requirement in this case? 
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In other cases, however, the courts have acknowledged the importance of inherent job 
requirements and upheld them as defense in particular circumstances. The best illustration of this, 
with regard to S187 (1) (e) is the case of Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd.156 Woolworths 
advertised an opening for a Human Resources Generalist in its Cape Town IT department. The 
Applicant Whitehead applied for the job, was interviewed and offered the position. She turned 
down the offer and Woolworths again placed the job post seeking applicants. They then contacted 
Whitehead, asking if her circumstances had changed and again offering her the position.157 She 
told them that yes, she was available and at the interview, revealed that she had recently 
discovered that she had become pregnant.158 Woolworths stated that two days later they left a 
voice message for Whitehead to contact them to discuss matters further. The Respondent disputed 
the content of the message, claiming that they wished to "finalize the paperwork," suggesting that 
the hiring decision had been made, and was awaiting only legal formalities.159 
 
Woolworths, rather than following up to employ Whitehead, instead hired another applicant, Dr. 
Young, on the basis that they were more highly qualified. The Applicant took the matter to court 
on claiming to have been unfairly dismissed on the basis of her pregnancy whuch was contrary to 
section 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7 of the LRA. She claimed that she had been offered, and accepted the 
job, creating an existing employment relationship.160 The Respondent argued that the requirement 
of uninterrupted job contuinity was not an arbitrary ground on which the respondents unfairly 
discriminated against the Applicant because it was the inherent requirement for the position the 
Applicant applied for, and thus they had not acted fairly according to section (2)(c) of Scehdeule 7 
of the LRA.161 The court a quo dismissed the Respondent’s argument by holding that an inherent 
job requirement is a requirement that must be so inherent that if not met an applicant would 
simply not qualify for the post. The court found that in the circumstances the requirement was 
not so inherent that the Applicant would not have been able to carry out the job, and thus 
upheld the Applicants claim that she had been refused the job due to her pregnancy. 
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Woolworths then appealed to the Labour Appeal Court162 and argued that they had not 
discriminated against the Respondent on the basis of her pregnancy, but that they required an 
individual who would be available to work for an uninterrupted period of one year. In addition 
they argued, Dr Young who they hired instead of Whitehead was better suited for the position both 
in qualifications and experience,163 and was better able to perform the job requirements. 
 
 
Three judges heard the appeal. Zondo AJP rejected Woolworth’s continuity requirement and held 
that Whitehead was mainly denied the position advertised because there was a more suitable 
candidate that would be available for the required 12 month period, and not due to her 
pregnancy.164 Willis JA held that Woolworths' need for an employee who would be available for a 
continuous period was “rational and commercially understandable”, and was thus appropriate of 
them to employ a person that would fulfill the continuity requirement.165 Conradie JA took the 
minority opinion that Whitehead had in fact been refused employment on the basis of her 
pregnancy,166 and argued in addition that the continuity requirement was not valid in determining 
whether Whitehead was suitable for the job.167 
 
The court held that the Respondent had been rejected in favor of a more qualified applicant,168 and 
not because of her pregnancy. This case emphasizes that where an employer can demonstrate that 
a pregnant employee is unfit for a particular job position due to the operational requirements of 
the job, refusal to give the applicant or employee the job position may be justified depending on 




An employee may be properly dismissed on the grounds of misconduct,169 which may be classified 
as either ordinary or gross misconduct according to item 3(4) of schedule 8 of the LRA.The section 
stipulates: 
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“Generally, it is not appropriate todismiss an employee for a first offence, except if the misconduct is 
serious and of such gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable. Examples of 
serious misconduct, subject to the rule that each case should be judged on its merits, are gross dishonesty 
or willful damage to the property of the employer, willful end angering of the safety of others, physical 
assault on the employer, a fellow employee, client or customer and gross insubordination. Whatever the 




An employer is obliged to investigate each case of misconduct adequately (though not necessarily 
formally) to obtain the facts of the incident.170 The employer must then give notice of warning to 
the employee, alerting them that they risk dismissal if the conduct is continued, except in cases of 
gross misconduct, where the requirement of notice is waived.171 If the requirements have been 
satisfied, the dismissal will be deemed fair. However the employer must take into account 
considerations such as the employees’ circumstances and the nature of the misconduct.172 It is 
important to note that S187(1)(e) does not provide pregnant employees blanket immunity from 
dismissal, and they may be fairly dismissed on the basis of ordinary or gross misconduct, provided 
that the dismissal is substantively and procedurally fair. 
 
 
It should be highlighted, that cases involving misconduct must be treated consistently. In National 
Union of Mineworkers in South Africa obo Engelbrecht v Delta Motor Corporation (1998) 5 
BALR 573 (CCMA) the employee was relieved of his employment contract for concealing a 
previous act of dishonesty whilst employed for another company in his job application. However, 
the court ordered that the employee be re-instated on the basis that the employer had previously 
allowed similar misconduct by another employee. 
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This chapter will discuss the remedies available for automatic unfair dismissals under S187(1)(e) 
of the LRA. It will explore the two remedial aspects of compensation and damages, and further 
discuss whether or not the compensation awarded in such matters are intended to be punitive. 
 
 
5.2 Remedies Available for Unfair Dismissals 
 
In ordinary unfair dismissals, the employee may be re-instated, re-employed, and/or granted 
monetary compensation under S193(1) of the LRA which states: 
 
193. Remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice 
 
(1) If the Labour Court or an arbitrator appointed in terms of this Act finds that a dismissal is unfair, the 
 
Court or the arbitrator may- 
 
(a) order the employer to reinstate the employee from any date not earlier than the date of 
dismissal; 
(b) order the employer to re-employ the employee, either in the work in which the employee was 
employed before the dismissal or in other reasonably suitable work on any terms and from any 
date not earlier than the date of dismissal; or 




Re-instatement entails that the employee be treated as if they had not been dismissed, and paid for 
the lost earnings incurred during the period of unfair dismissal.173 The employee is also entitled to 
any favorable changes in the terms of employment that were expected during that period, such as  
pay raises or benefits. The remedy of re-employment returns the employee to work, either in their 
previous position, or another, but does not provide compensation for loss of earnings.174 Monetary 
compensation is the final remedy, awarded to the aggrieved employee to cover the financial loss 
that they have occurred. The maximum compensation awarded for normal unfair dismissal claims 
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is the equivalent of 12 months’ pay.175 The courts calculate the amount of compensation by 
examining the extent of the employee’s financial loss and unique circumstances of the matter.176 
 
The procedure to determine which remedy to follow is set out in S193(2) of the LRA which states: 
 
 
(2) The Labour Court or the arbitrator must require the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee 
unless- 
(a) the employee does not wish to be reinstated or re-employed; 
 
(b) the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a continued employment relationship 
would be intolerable; 
(c) it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee; or 
 
(d) the dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair procedure. 
 
 
Therefore, by default, an employer is obliged to re-instate or re-employ an unfairly dismissed 
employee unless the employee does not wish to be, or if the employee-employer relationship has 
been rendered intolerable during the conflict, or if re-instatement/re-employment is unpractical. 
Lastly, the obligation on the employer to re-instate/re-employ is waived if the dismissal was unfair 
only for procedural reasons, but substantively fair.177 
 
It is important to note that while an employee may refuse re-instatement or re-employment, this 
does not automatically entitle them to claim compensation the refusal is found to be unreasonable. 
This was illustrated in the case of Rawlins v Kemp t/a Centralmed (2010) 31 ILJ 2325 (SCA) in 
which, the appellant fell pregnant and agreed with her employee that she would take two months 
maternity leave, two weeks of which would be paid.178 The employer then suggested that she find 
alternative employment as the practice was facing financial difficulties and in order to save 
money, wished to employ a junior doctor at a lower salary.179 The employer then wrote a letter 
terminating her employment due to financial circumstances of the practice.180 The employee then 
took the matter to the CCMA seeking a finding of automatic unfair dismissal due to pregnancy and 
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sought 24 months’ salary as compensation. Failing to reach consensus, the matter was taken to 
Labour Court, which held that the employee had not been dismissed based on her pregnancy but 
that she had been dismissed unfairly and awarded her compensation in the amount of 12 
months’salary and upheld that the employee’s refusal to be re-instated was reasonable. 
 
 
The employer brought the matter to the Labour Appeal Court to decide whether the compensation 
was payable, and the court was divided in the judgment. The majority (Zondo JP and Waglay JA) 
held that there was no need for compensation as the employee had not been dismissed unfairly. 
The minority judge held that the employee should have received only 6 months’ salary as 
compensation. There upon, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court of Appeal,181 which held 
that the employee was not entitled to compensation for unfair dismissal. They reasoned that the 
reason for compensation is to ensure that the employee recovers from any financial loss incurred 
by the dismissal and that the employee would have a great chance to obtain alternative 
employment given her qualifications.182 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that when an employer acknowledges its error in 
dismissing an employee, and makes a reasonable offer to remedy the situation, the employee must 
carefully consider that offer,  and realize that by rejecting a reasonable remedy,183they risk being 
refused compensation. The Supreme Court of Appeal then dismissed the matter. This case shows 
that when fair remedy is offered, the employee’s right to refuse re-instatement or re-employment is 
not an opportunity to “cash in” and move on to other work. The expectation of fairness and good 
faith applies to both parties. 
In matters of automaticly unfair dismissals, remedies frequently impose a larger financial burden 
on the employer on the basis that employee labour rights have been infringed upon or that the 
employee has been discriminated against, in violation of their Constitutional rights.184 The 
severity of such violations justify heavier and more financially straining remedies in these cases, 
in the hopes of keeping safe fair labour practices and basic human rights belonging to every 
individual.185 
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It is submitted that the penalties levied against employers found to have committed an automatically 
unfair dismissal is intended in part as a deterrent to other employees from behaving in the same 
manner; and to forcefully assert the basic rights of all individuals irrespective of their employment 
contracts. Section 193(3) of the LRA provides that: 
 
 
“If a dismissal is automatically unfair or, if a dismissal based on the employer's operational 
requirements is found to be unfair, the Labour Court in addition may make any other order that it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances.” 
 
 
This section gives the courts broad discretionary power to assign additional sanctions to an 
employer if they are found to have committed an automatically unfair dismissal. It is submitted 
that the legislature intended to give the courts flexibility and latitude in providing sufficient remedy 
to cases of automatic unfair dismissal. The word “appropriate,” left undefined, enables the courts 
to use providing various forms of remedy to aggrieved employees dismissed on discriminatory 
grounds. Section 193(3) provides an example for an “appropriate” order,  stating: 
 
“The Court, for example, in the case of a dismissal that constitutes an act of discrimination, may 
wish to issue an interdict obliging the employer to stop the discriminatory practice in addition to 
one of the other remedies it may grant”. 
 
The courts have elected in many cases to use damages as “appropriate” remedy for such 
discriminatory dismissals. For instance, in the case of Hunt v ICC Car Importer Services Co (Pty) 
Ltd186 the court ordered the employer to pay compensation and awarded the employee solatium 
(sentimental “damages”) for the harm the employee had suffered. Note that damages are a separate 
remedy under the EEA, not s187 of the LRA. 
 
 
Section 194(3) of the LRA then states that: 
 
“The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is automatically unfair must be just 
and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than the equivalent of 24 months' 
remuneration calculated at the employee's rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal”. 
                                                          




The section makes clear that in matters of automatic unfair dismissal an employee is entitled to a 
maximum of 24 months’ salary incompensation. This provision allows for twice the the amount of 
ordinary unfair dismissals, which is limited to 12 months’ salary. However it should be noted that 
the courts have upheld the notion that “the statutory provision for a maximum of 24 months 
compensation for an automatically unfair dismissal should not be used as a yard stick against 




This provision additionally places a burden on the courts to uphold “just” and “equitable” 
compensation in matters involving discrimination. The court must then interpret the meaning of 
these words when assigning the amount of compensation.The court in the Rawlins
189
case discussed 
above, decided that to be“just”and “equitable”meant to compensate the employee so as to place 
them as they would have been if they had not been unfairly dismissed, and not to go beyond that, 
and place them in a better financial position. 
 
In summary, a pregnant employee wrongfully dismissed under S187(1)(e) can claim a readily 
available remedy in terms of the LRA. The remedies available for an automatic unfair dismissal 
are re-instatement, re-employment, compensation and any other remedy that is found appropriate 
by the courts.  
5.3 Compensation 
 
Compensation in S194 of the LRA refers to the employees’ remuneration. As mentioned above the 
courts can grant a maximum of 24 months’ remuneration to the employee if for an automatically 
unfair ground of dismissal, such as pregnancy’. 
 
It was held in CEPWAWU v Glass & Aluminum 2000 CC “that the amount of compensation 
awarded for an automatically unfair dismissal must reflect the fact that, save in exceptional 
circumstances, the employee would be entitled to fully retrospective reinstatement, not only to 
ensure that the employee lost nothing as a result of the dismissal. Where reinstatement is not 
requested, compensation should be calculated accordingly”. 
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There are a number of factors to be taken into account when calculating the amount of 
compensation involved. These factors were summarized by the court in the matter of C. Van 
Heerden and H Coetzee as follows: 
 
(a) the nature of the dismissal (whether it was automatically unfair);  
(b) whether the dismissal is substantively or procedurally unfair or both; 
(c) the nature and extent of the deviation from the procedural requirements when a dismissal is 
procedurally unfair; 
(d) whether the employee was guilty of misconduct inso far as the reason for dismissal is 
misconduct (see also Transnet Ltd v CCMA190 where the court stated that the‘offensive nature’ of 
the misconduct of an employee must play a role in the quantum of compensation awarded (1300a) 
and that even when there are procedural irregularities, if the offence was of a ‘reprehensible 
nature, compensation would be inappropriate (1301a)); 
(e) the consequences for the parties when compensation is awarded and when it is not; 
(f) the need to provide a remedy where a wrong has been committed; 
(g) the impact of the conduct of the employee upon the employer or the business of the employer 
inso far as the employee may have done something wrong which gave rise to his dismissal but 
where it was not sufficient to warrant dismissal and the conduct by either party that undermines 
or promotes any objects of the LRA,…”191 
 
 
The factors mentioned above will vary depending on the facts of each case, therefore there is no 
closed list of what the court must take into consideration when determing compensation.192 It 
should be brought to an employee’s attention that figure of 24 months’ salary is the maximum 
figure, and the employee is by no means guaranteed to receive that amount. Some courts are 
reluctant to award the maximum amount, and stick to the principle that compensation should be 
“just” and “equitable,” as taken to mean that it should restore, but not improve the financial status 
of the employee. 
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In the case of Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU
193
it stipulated that compensation for unfair 
labour practices was not intended to punish the employer but to be “fair and reasonable”. In 
regards to what should be considered as adequate compensation, the court held “in matters of 
unfair dismissal, once the court has decided that compensation should be granted it is obliged to 
grant at least the full amount as prescribed for by section 194(1), where as in an unfair labour 
practice the court or the arbitrator must grant such amount as it considers to be fair and 
reasonable.”194 
 
The Rawlins case195 discussed above, is a clear example of the court’s reluctance toaward the 
maximum amount to an automatically unfairly dismissed employee on the basis of pregnancy if that 
amount would have the effect of enriching the employee rather than simply restoring them to the 
state had not been dismissed.  
 
Some cases have awarded the employee an amount close to the maximum 24 months,196 hence the 
compensation will vary based on the facts of the case and the inclination of the courts. In the case 
of Lukie v Rural Alliance cct/a Rural Development Specialists (2004) 25 ILJ 1445 (LC) the court 
awarded 20 months of compensation, for the unfair dismissal of a pregnant employee. This 
tendency towards greater compensation is not seen often in dismissals based on S187(1)(e). Thus 
wrongfully dismissed pregnant employees should bear in mind that exceptional circumstances are 
often required to be awarded the maximum amount. A dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy does 





Damages under the LRA can be awarded to an aggrieved employee that has been unfair dismissed 
under S158 (1)(a)(vi) of the LRA. The section entails that the Labour Court may make “an award 
of damages in any circumstances contemplated” within the LRA. It should be noted that 
compensation is a tool used by the statute to comfort the employee for the infringement of their 
entitled employment rights to fair labour practices, while damages derived from common law 
which is used to pay the employee that has been unfairly dismissed patrimonial loss based on a 
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breach of contract or delict law.197 There is a distinction between compensation and damages due 
to their origins and their purpose. However, damages are divided into patrimonial loss and non-
patrimonial loss. The patrimonial aspect of damages deals with the actual financial loss such as 
loss of income, while the non-patrimonial loss deals with pain and suffering, and attacks on 
human dignity.198 The courts have acknowledged non-patrimonial damages in S187(1)(e) matters 
by awarding solatium damages to wrongfully dismissed pregnant employees.199 
 
Solatium damages are simply “an amount of solace money paid to a plaintiff by a defendant for the 
impairment of the personality interest of the plaintiff.”200 The object of solatium damages is that 
the employee have a feeling of satisfaction for the “Injustice, injury and suffering which he 
(actually or presumably) sustained as a result of the defendant’s conduct.”201 Consequently the 
LRA provides for compensation for patrimonial loss under S193 and allows for non-patrimonial 
solatium damages in S158. With no fixed method on how to calculate solatium damages, the 
courts rely on their discretion on what an adequate amount of solatium damages would be, in the 
circumstances of each case.202 Remember that this does not relate to a cause of action under s187 – 
this deals with dismissal. S158 deals with other causes of action that are not dismissal. 
 
In the case of Wallace v DuToit
203
 the court awarded solatium damages for the impairment of the 
applicant’s dignity and self-esteem due to the dismissal being based on the discriminatory ground 
of pregnancy.204 In the case of Hunt v ICC Car Importer Services Co (Pty) Ltd
205
 the Court ordered 
the employer to pay solatium damages as well as six weeks remuneration for patrimonial loss 






The next aspect to be discussed is if the courts deliberately aim to award punitive compensation in 
matters that deal with automatic unfair dismissals under S187(1)(e) of the LRA. It is not able that 
the automatic unfair compensation has double the limit of ordinary unfair dismissals, which shows 
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its intention to uphold section 23 of the 1996 Constitution and the basic rights of each individual 
under the 1996 Constitution.206 
 
However, in spite of the obligation to determine a “just” and “equitable” compensation, some 
courts do go beyond this measure and punished the employer for their discriminatory behavior.207 
In the case of Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 ILJ 2357(CC) the court held that: 
 
“The determination of appropriate relief, therefore, calls for the balancing of the various interests 
that might be affected by the remedy. The balancing process must at least be guided by the 
objective, first, to address the wrong occasioned by the infringement of a constitutional right; 
second, to deter future violations, third, to make an order that can be complied with; and fourth, of 
fairness to all those who might be affected by the relief. Invariably, the nature of the right 
infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in 
the particular case.  Therefore, indetermining the appropriate relief, 'we must carefully analyze 
the natureof [the]constitutional infringement, and strike effectively at its source”. 
 
The above opinion argues that in determining compensation the courts should take into account 
the Constitutional and labour interests of the employee so as to determine the extent of the 
infringement. Thus compensation should focus on determining the extentor degree of the 
infringement to determine the amount of damages needed to rectify the constitutional infringment. 
 
In the case of Mogale v Seima 2008 (5) SA 637(SCA) the court expressed that awarding of 
compensation should not be punitive in civil courts proceedings.208 It further emphasized that 
damages are awarded to console a plaintiff for his “wounded feelings” and not to “penalize or to 
deter the defendant for his wrong doing, nor to deter people from doing what the defendant has 
done.”209 In addition it also held that“punishment and deterrence are functions of the criminal law, 
not the law of delict.”210 
 
However, in other cases such as Botha v Import Export International CC,211 the courts have taken 
the punitive approach in awarding compensation so as to deter employers from acting in a 
                                                          
206 Chapter 2 of the Constitution-Human Rights. 
207Botha v Import Export International CC (1999) 20 ILJ 2580 (LC). 
208Mogale v Seima 2008 (5) SA 637 (SCA) at 11. 
209 Note 208 above, 11. 
210 Note 208 above,11. 
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discriminatory manner. The case of Sheridan v The Original Mary–Ann’s at the Colony (Pty) LTD 
(1990) 20 ILJ 2952 (LC) also took a punitive approach when awarding compensation. The cour t 
held that, the employer’s conduct was aggravating. Consequently, the court instructed the 
employer to pay 24 months’ salary as compensation to the employee for the automatically unfair 
dismissal. It should be noted that cases that allow for a more punitive approach are more likely to 
award the maximum compensation or close to it. In the Lukie case
212
 the court awarded 20 months’ 
salary as compensation and in the Mnguni case213the court awarded the maximum amount. 
 
The case law is split, with two different approaches as to whether compensation in automatically 









It is imperative that both women and men have equal footing with in the labour market. Labour 
practices that do not allow for women to enjoy the same rights and privelages as men should be 
addressed and removed by law, as women are entitled by the 1996 Constitution and LRA to fair 
and safe labour practices. Women are biologically unique as the sex that carries unborn children 
and thus a dismissal based on pregnancy can be taken as discrimination against women. This study 
has shown that section 187(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act has been highly effective in 
protecting the employment and Constitutional rights of pregnant employees and those on 
maternity leave from discrimination on the basis of their pregnancy status. 
 
The wording of S187(1)(e) has been interpreted and applied by the courts to ensure that women 
that are dismissed for reasons linked to their pregnancy may seek redress under the provision. The 
courts have demonstrated through precedent that the provision permits a broad and inclusive view 
of what constitutes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy to disallow any form of such 
discrimination in employment. Crucially, S187(1)(e) also shields pregnant applicants and 
probationary employees from discrimination in obtaining employment, ensuring that employers 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
211 Note 207 above. 
212 Note 97above. 
213 Note 47above. 
214 S Vettori (Note 176 above,107). 
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must take care to avoid denying a hopeful applicant employment on the basis of pregnancy status. 
The law also protects women from ancillary pregnancy related discrimination when pregnant 
employees fail to disclose their pregnancy status, fail to perform efficiently at work due to the 
natural biological effects of pregnancy such a morning sickness, or have a child against the wishes 
of their employer. Women under these circumstances are frequently dismissed along with an 
accusation of dishonesty, incompetence, or insubordination and the courts have rejected all such 
attempts as invalid. 
 
The provision entails that the evidential burden falls on the employee first, to demonstrate that 
they have been dismissed, and then on the basis of pregnancy. The employer may then attempt to 
defend themselves by proving that the employee has been dismissed on valid grounds. The 
employer may not rely simply on their own family values or preferences in dismissing a pregnant 
employee, but only on legally valud grounds such as misconduct, incapacity, or in some instances 
operational requirements. Many employers have turned to the excuse of operational requirements, 
often arguing that uninterrupted employment periods are necessary, and validate the dismissal of a 
pregnant woman, who would not meet this requirement. However, the courts have made sure that 
dismissing a pregnant employee under operational requirements would be deemed fair and a valid 
reason only if the employer can prove that the employee is unfit for the job description. 
 
The remedies available within the provision are re-instatement, re-employment and 
compensation. The unfairly dismissed employee can choose to be re-instated or re-employed, or 
refuse those options and claim for compensation if the relationship between them and the 
employer has been made intolerable. However, if an employee unreasonably refuses to be re-
instated or re-employed after the employee has attempted to make fair restitution, the courts may 
refuse to grant the compensation. Therefore, employees should be cautioned to be reasonable 
when considering re-instatement or re-employment. 
 
A claim to dismissal based on S187(1)(e) is not an assurance of compensation or damages. The 
courts will evaluate the facts of the circumstances and determine whether the employee had been 
dismissed on other lawful grounds such as misconduct, operational requirements or incapacity. 
There are no set criteria used in when determining the amount of compensation, however the 
courts do take into account fairness regarding the extent of discrimination; the impact of the 
discrimination; and the reason given for the discrimination. 
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In addition, the statutory limit of compensation that can be claimed by the employee is 24 
months’ salary for automatically unfair dismissals, and 12 months’ for normal cases. Section 158 
of the LRA further allows for solatium damages to be administered when calculating the amount 
of compensation awarded to the employee. Therefore, the employee can claim for both damages 
and compensation. Consequently, some courts have regarded the remedy of compensation in 
matters involving S187(1)(e) of the LRA as punitive towards the employer, while other reject this 
practice. 
The question of whether the amount of compensation should be punitive or merely compensatory 
has been debated in several cases regarding automatically unfair dismissals. There have been cases 
and literature that support the view that compensation should not have a punitive aspect but should 
be “fair” and “equitable”. It is submitted, that the mere fact of having double the limit in 
compensation compared to ordinary dismals, is grounds for a punitive element to exist within 
compensation. The courts must establish a consensus whether the aspect of compensation should 
be made punitive or only compensatory and based on the element of fairness. It would be in the 
courts’ interest to make a clear formula that is applicable to matters involving dismissed pregnant 
employees, so that there is a consistent fairness across all courts when awarding damages in 
regards to S187(1)(e) of the LRA. 
 
Pregnant employees should be aware that they are protected under S187(1)(e) of the LRA as well 
as the 1996 Constitution. However, they should also be aware that they should only claim for 
dismissal under the section if they can prove they have been dismissed on the basis of their 
pregnancy, and not for other reasons such as misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements. 
In many cases, the employer may attempt to hide their discriminatory dismissal behind a false 
claim to these legitimate reasons. But there is also false assumption that a positive pregnancy status 
will automatically secure a certain amount of compensation and damages, while in reality the facts 
of the case will determine whether there really has been a dismissal based on pregnancy. The 
courts have a clear duty to protect pregnant employees from unfair dismissal; but also a duty to  
protect employers from false and extortionist claims to being dismissed on the basis of pregnancy. 
Consequently, it is of great importance that employers inform their employees clearly and in 
simple terms of the reasons for dismissal and show evidence to support their decision to prevent 
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